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Abstract  
Self-reflection refers to our ability to think about ourselves and our lives and to ask and 
answer questions ranging from “Who am I?” to “Why did I do this?”. It is thus considered a 
valuable means to gain self-knowledge. Structurally, reflection involves two elements, a 
reflecting and a reflected-on, in other words a subject and an object. In the case of self-
reflection, subject and object are the same, the reflecting is the reflected-on. As subject and 
object are traditionally conceived of as radically opposed i.e. mutually exclusive, this situation 
has led to considering self-reflection problematic: If self-reflection is always reflection on an 
object, it is thought that self-reflection cannot yield insight into oneself qua subject and might 
even represent a danger to one’s subjectivity which is characteristic of lived life. Refuting the 
mutual exclusiveness of subject and object, self-reflection can be regained as a valuable 
means to gain self-knowledge. It is thereby going to be demonstrated that self-reflection has a 
dialectical structure. The nature of the self-knowledge yielded by self-reflection conceived of 
as dialectic is going to be explored. A final part shows how a dialectical account of self-
reflection proves useful in clarifying the role which self-reflection plays in schizophrenia. 
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Introduction 
	  
Self-reflection refers to our ability to think about ourselves and our lives and to ask and 
answer questions ranging from “Who am I?” to “Why did I do this?”, “Why did I say this?” or 
“Why do I feel like this?”. It is thus a cognitive process which, so it is believed, makes 
something that was formerly implicit, e.g. the considerations and motivations for an action or 
a judgement, explicit and thereby delivers what has been termed self-knowledge, self-
understanding or self-comprehension. Engaging in self-reflection then is our way to follow 
the Delphian calling “Know thyself”, metaphorically speaking to set out to find ourselves. 
The importance of this mental activity is widely recognised. Socrates expresses it saying that 
“life without examination is not worth a man’s living” (Plato 1997, sec.38a) and that it is 
through examination of one’s life that one becomes happy (ibid., 36e). In this vein, the ability 
to self-reflect has been described as what makes psychic activity specifically human and as 
such to be indispensable for mental health (Jaspers 1997, p.347).   
     Structurally, self-reflection always involves two elements, a reflecting and a reflected-on; 
in other words, a subject and an object. The separation of subject and object as it takes place 
in self-reflection is seen to bring about a new awareness which is object-like or explicit. But 
this very separating and explicating process holds a risk, as aptly expressed in the myth of 
Narcissus. Sitting by a lake, Narcissus looks into the water and sees himself reflected on the 
surface. He falls in love with his reflected image and wishes to get closer to it, feel it and hold 
it. Narcissus bends over, touches the surface of the water only to realise that the image eludes 
his grasp.  Becoming aware that he will never be able to reach the reflected image of himself, 
he despairs and commits suicide (Ovid 1986, bk.III, verses 343-513). Instead of finding 
himself, he has lost himself. Seeing the living Narcissus as the implicit subject, and his 
reflected image which brings himself in front of his own eyes in an object-like manner, as the 
explicit, and conceiving of self-reflection as aiming at grasping the implicit explicitly, the 
situation lends itself to the following interpretations: Narcissus’ realisation that there is a 
fundamental difference between the implicit and the explicit making it impossible for the 
implicit to get hold of its own explicit, means that self-reflection is impossible. Sartre, in this 
vein, calls self-reflection a “failure” (2003, p.177). Given this impossibility, it is thought that 
self-reflection cannot be an adequate means to gain insight into oneself and one’s life. The 
situation has also been interpreted as demonstrating a danger inherent in all aspiration to 
explication as the latter seems to jeopardise the implicit i.e. lived life.  Such a position is most 
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prominently taken up by Dreyfus (2005). In the light of Narcissus’ fate, which was predicted 
by the seer Tiresias’s prophesy that Narcissus should only live long if he did never come to 
know himself (ibid.), is the Delphian calling to self-knowledge to be ignored? How can the 
picture of self-reflection as impossible or dangerous be reconciled with the intuition that self-
reflection plays a central role in a human being’s life and affords self-knowledge?  
     The project of this dissertation is to give credit to the Delphian calling and to establish self-
reflection as an adequate means to pursue it whilst accommodating the risk expressed by the 
myth of Narcissus. To meet the apparent contradiction and the challenge it poses to self-
reflection as an important feature of human life, the form of separation taking place in self-
reflection has to be examined. This will include an analysis of our understanding of the notion 
of explication, which is closely bound up with the notion of objectification. My argument will 
show that the separation between implicit and explicit is not to be drawn starkly and that 
explication therefore does not mean relinquishing the implicit. Regarding self-reflection, it 
will follow that it has a dialectical structure rather than being a linear transition from implicit 
to explicit and that as such, it is possible and cognitively valuable. 
 
Two terminological clarifications concerning the use and meaning of the word ‘reflection’ 
have to be put in place to begin with. 
     Firstly it has to be noted, that the noun ‘reflection’ refers to both ‘reflective’ and 
‘reflexive’ processes. Narcissus reflects himself in the meaning of the word ‘to reflect’ as in 
to throw back light. This passive process has to be distinguished from the active, cognitive 
process to which the adjective ‘reflective’ refers and where ‘to reflect’ means to turn back 
one’s thoughts (Anon 1999). It is going to be shown how these two processes are related. 
     Secondly, a narrow and a broad sense of self-reflection have to be distinguished. In the 
narrow sense, self-reflection means reflection of the self i.e. it refers to the cognitive process 
by which one examines one’s self. By self, I understand the phenomenal self, the experiential 
dimension of subjectivity whose reality is widely agreed upon even amongst proponents of a 
no-self doctrine (Metzinger 2005, p.8). I do not mean to make any claims regarding a 
metaphysical or empirical self. In the broad sense, self-reflection refers to reflection of 
everything that is experientially one’s own, i.e. to the cognitive process by which one 
examines one’s perceptions, actions, beliefs, attitudes, abilities and so forth. Reflection, 
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without the qualification of self-, denotes a meta-mental process whose object is not further 
specified.1 
 
The first part of this essay will establish preliminaries concerning the relationship of self-
reflection and consciousness before addressing two challenges that have been levelled against 
self-reflection. The first challenge has been brought up against self-reflection in the narrow 
sense and calls its very possibility into question. Consequently, it claims that self-reflection is 
not an adequate means to gain self-knowledge. This conception of inadequateness also 
underlies the second challenge, the latter having been brought up against self-reflection in the 
broad sense, in particular reflection on one’s actions. It claims that self-reflection jeopardises 
skilled action because the explication taking place in self-reflection is seen to represent a 
danger to the implicitness of lived life. The answer to both challenges is going to lead to a 
dialectical account of self-reflection allowing for explication without giving up the implicit. 
The second part will develop such an account and look into the effects of self-reflection 
conceived of as dialectic. In particular, it will expand on the nature of self-knowledge. In part 
III psychopathologies related to self-reflection are going to be discussed in the light of the 
dialectical account developed earlier. The discussion focuses on the role which self-reflection 
and its disturbances play in schizophrenia.   
     Especially part I and II draw on Jaspers’ account of self-reflection and understanding as 
laid down in his General Psychopathology in the context of meaningful psychic connections 
(1997, pt.2, chap. V). However, it is not the intention of this essay to provide a scholarly 
interpretation of Jaspers’ work. Rather, Jaspers’ ideas are shown to be useful in answering the 
challenges which self-reflection faces and in developing an account of self-reflection which 
accommodates its link with psychopathologies whilst emphasising its non-pathological 
nature. Thereby, the account intends to come closer to our everyday understanding of self-
reflection as a valuable and important part of human life. Due to the paucity of literature on 
Jaspers’ work on self-reflection 2, it is hoped that this paper might inspire further and more 
scholarly research in this area.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The question whether all reflection is in fact self-reflection or at least involves an element of self-reflection will 
not be addressed here.  
2 Research on google scholar, JSTOR and Project MUSE for ‘Jaspers’ and ‘self-reflection’ yielded no relevant 
results. Private communication with Thomas Fuchs, Karl Jaspers chair for philosophical foundations of 
psychiatry and psychotherapy  in Heidelberg, Germany, with Matthew Ratcliffe, Durham, UK,  and Louis A. 
Sass, Rutgers University, USA, confirmed the absence of well-known work on Jaspers’ account of self-
reflection. 
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Part I: Challenges to Self-Reflection 
Self-reflection and self-consciousness 
	  
Self-reflection is seen to be intimately linked with self-consciousness. The nature of this link 
however is conceived of in radically opposed ways: Whereas so-called Higher-Order Theories 
of Consciousness (e.g. Carruthers 2000; Rosenthal 1996; Dennett 1991) hold self-reflection to 
be a necessary requirement for self-consciousness, in the phenomenological tradition, self-
consciousness is  held to be a necessary requirement for self-reflection. Self-consciousness on 
this conception is therefore pre-reflectively co-given in consciousness. Intending to base the 
account of self-reflection which is going to be advanced in this essay on pre-reflective self-
consciousness, this section introduces the latter by contrasting phenomenological with higher-
order theories of consciousness. 
 
Higher-order theories hold that phenomenal consciousness, i.e. the experience of what 
something is like, which appears to be intransitive, can be reduced to transitive consciousness 
(Rosenthal 1996, p.739). In other words, they hold that for someone to experience a mental 
state as conscious, this (first-order) mental state has to be taken as the object of another 
(second-order) mental state. Reflection is seen to provide these additional higher-order mental 
states and is thereby objectifying. Self-consciousness then depends on self-reflection and can 
consequently only be understood as consciousness of an objectified self, not as consciousness 
in itself or simpliciter. 
     There are a host of objections against higher-order theories of consciousness 3. For the 
purpose of this essay however, I will focus on the problem of the first-person perspective of 
consciousness. Consciousness being a first-person phenomenon (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 
p.14), to be conscious of a mental state means to be aware of the mental state as one’s own i.e. 
to identify oneself as its subject. In Rosenthal’s words: “Only if one’s thought is about oneself 
as such, and not about someone that happens to be oneself, will the mental state be a 
conscious state.” (1996, p.750) As Shoemaker (1968, p.561) has pointed out, one can only 
identify oneself as the subject of a mental state in virtue of knowing something to be true of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
3	  Criticisms concern the fact that higher-order theories do not allow phenomenal consciousness to animals and 
infants (Carruthers 2005, p.11; see ibid. chap.11 for a refutation of the problematics), that they demand attention 
where most of the time we seem to have conscious experiences without making any mental effort (Lycan & 
Ryder 2003) and that they lead into an infinite regress (Sartre 2003, p.8) as given that a second-order mental 
state is needed to make a mental state conscious, there has to be a third-order mental state to make the second-
order mental state conscious and so forth ad infinitum (Ryle argues that the regress is not problematic as any 
higher-order mental state is "logically [only] condemned to penultimacy", 1994, p.39) 
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oneself. Holding something to be true of oneself however again requires the identification of 
oneself and so forth ad infinitum thus leading into a regress. This regress points at an 
explanatory gap: To avoid leaving conscious experiences in a vacuum devoid of a subject, 
higher-order theories of consciousness have to accept that there is a fundamental difference 
between third-person object-identification and first-person self-identification (ibid.) and that 
the latter consists in a specific first-person perspective. On higher-order theories, this first-
person perspective, which can also be called a minimal form of self-consciousness, has to be 
posited (Zahavi 2005, p.27). However, having to posit self-consciousness as the first-person 
perspective that all consciousness necessarily involves is not consistent with their claim that 
all consciousness is transitive. Self-consciousness cannot be provided by self-reflection as 
self-reflection presupposes self-consciousness (Sartre 2003, p.9) and the attempt to construe 
consciousness as an extrinsic property bestowed on a mental state by an act of reflection 
therefore fails. Self-consciousness must be independent of self-reflection, it must be an 
intrinsic property of consciousness. Itself enabling reflection, it must be pre-reflective. 
     In the phenomenological tradition, consciousness does not depend on additional mental 
states, but is seen to be intransitive, “an intrinsic feature of the primary experience” (Zahavi 
2005, p.20). Contrary to Rosenthal’s criticism that “[w]e would insist that being conscious is 
an intrinsic property of mental states only if we were convinced that it lacked articulated 
structure, and thus defied explanation.” (1993, p.157), it is precisely by analysing the structure 
of consciousness that phenomenologists can account for the first-person perspective. Firstly, 
consciousness is intentional: it is always consciousness of something. This means that 
consciousness necessarily has an object and is thereby “oriented towards a being which is not 
itself.” (Sartre 2003, p.17). Secondly, consciousness is reflexive i.e. turned back on itself and 
thereby always also self-consciousness (Heidegger 2001, p.135). This self-consciousness is 
not an additional mental state (Sartre 2003, p.10) but implied in the primary conscious 
experience; it is immediate, pre-reflective, does therefore not require attention and is non-
objectifying (ibid., p.9). Accounting for the first-person perspective of conscious experience, 
for its implicit quality of mineness (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p.50), pre-reflective self-
consciousness is “subjectivity itself” (Sartre 2003, p.13) and as a “constitutive feature and 
integral part of phenomenal consciousness” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p.50), it is pervasive 
of all conscious experience. Co-given in this multitude of conscious experiences, pre-
reflective self-consciousness is internally differentiated (Zahavi 2005, p.92). Importantly, it is 
not to be mistaken for explicit, thematic self-consciousness or self-knowledge, but it allows 
for reflection, explication and thematisation (Sartre 2003, p.9; Zahavi 2005, p.23).  
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     In summary, it was shown that a non-thematic form of self-consciousness must be co-
given with any conscious mental state and that self-reflection is therefore not a requirement 
for self-consciousness. This internally differentiated pre-reflective self-consciousness which 
emerges through the reflexive structure of consciousness, can then ground self-reflection. 
 
Self-reflection and objectification 
	  
Having established subjectivity as pre-reflective and consequently non-objectifying self-
consciousness which is pervasive of all conscious experience, it is now possible to address the 
challenges that have been levelled against self-reflection. These challenges take their starting 
point from the fact that reflection needs an object and that it is therefore in this sense 
necessarily objectifying. Seeing subjectivity and objectivity in stark opposition and 
consequently as mutually exclusive, the proponents of these challenges argue that self-
reflection is not an adequate means to gain insight into one’s subjectivity because by its 
objectifying nature, self-reflection distorts subjectivity4. It therefore seems impossible to 
access subjectivity reflectively and the attempt is seen to be dangerous. 
 
Natorp’s challenge 
 
The first challenge concerns the narrow sense of self-reflection and questions its very 
possibility. Seeing that reflection needs an object, this seems to pose a problem in the case of 
self-reflection since the reflecting and the reflected-on are the same: the object of reflection is 
the subject. But can the subject be made into an object and even if it can, does objectifying 
reflection then provide insight into the subject’s subjectivity? Natorp thought that this is 
impossible and expressed his challenge as follows: 
 
If one were oneself to try, if it were at all possible, to somehow grasp the content of 
immediate experience purely as it is in itself [...] would one then not somehow be 
forced [...] to artificially still and interrupt the continuous stream of becoming, 
which surely is how inner life presents itself [...]? But doesn’t one then detach it 
from the experienced, from the subjective, and doesn’t one then, nevertheless, make 
it into an object? In the end, one apparently never grasps the subjective, as such, in 
itself. On the contrary, in order to grasp it scientifically, one is forced to strip it of its 
subjective character. (1912, pp.102-103) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This characterisation of objectification as distortive of lived life is well reflected in the German word for object, 
‘Gegenstand’, literally ‘that which stands against’ i.e. a hindrance and obstacle. 
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Reflection, in Natorp’s view, tries to grasp something scientifically by which he understands 
an approach which is detached from the “stream” of “inner life”. Such detachment, which is 
opposed to the immersion and immediacy constitutive of subjectivity, is what Natorp 
considers to be the objectification necessarily implied in reflection. But the subject cannot be 
made into an object while retaining its subjective character. Consequently, self-reflection 
cannot yield any valuable insight into one’s subjectivity and is in thus far impossible. Holding 
that any act of expression, be it through language or behaviour, is objectifying and therefore 
distortive of subjectivity, it also follows that subjectivity is inexpressible (ibid., p.99).5 The 
myth of Narcissus suggests that not to accept the impossibility of self-reflection has fatal 
consequences. 
     It is crucial to note that Natorp’s argument relies on the assumption that the opposition of 
subject and object is radical, that being subject and being object is mutually exclusive. 
Objectification of the subject is therefore seen to be distortive of subjectivity, a misleading 
alteration if the aim is to gain insight into one’s subjectivity.  
 
Dreyfus’ challenge 
 
The second challenge concerns self-reflection in the broad sense, the reflection on what is 
experientially one’s own, in particular one’s actions. Paralleling the first challenge which 
drew a radical distinction between subject and object, this challenge relies on the radical 
opposition between skilled, absorbed action and self-reflection, a form of rational thinking. 
Skills, which allow everyday actions to be smooth, quick and performed without mental 
effort, are implicit, one’s awareness of them is non-thematic (Dreyfus 2007, p.104). Self-
reflection however makes them explicit i.e. brings them to thematic awareness. As being 
implicit and being explicit is seen to be mutually exclusive and as implicitness is held to be a 
necessary feature of skilled action, self-reflection is considered a threat to it. The breakdown 
of skilled action demonstrates the distortive effects of self-reflection.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  If the claim that subjectivity cannot be expressed in language were true, this would present a serious threat to 
phenomenology which intends to be a “science of consciousness per se” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p.14) and as 
consciousness is intrinsically first-person i.e. subjective. This is why Heidegger dedicated considerable effort to 
answer Natorp’s challenge (Heidegger 2007). Besides arguing against the subjectivity-disrupting character of 
reflection, Heidegger also rejects the underlying conception of language as too narrow. The same objection to 
phenomenology as a reflective science has recently been repeated by Mishara (2007, p.561), an answer to it can 
be found in Sass et al. (2011).  
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For an extreme example of the inverse relation of reflection and skilled action, 
consider the case of Chuck Knoblauch, a former second baseman for the New York 
Yankees. Knoblauch was so good he was voted best infielder, but one day, rather 
than simply throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and started 
reflecting on how he was throwing the ball—the mechanics of it, as he put it. […] 
After that, he couldn’t recover his former unreflective absorption and from then on 
he threw the ball erratically—once into the face of a spectator. (ibid., p.103)  
 
In Chuck Knoblauch’s case, thinking about what he was doing, i.e. self-reflection in the broad 
sense, got in the way of actually doing it and was observably distortive of his formerly skilled 
action. It made his throws erratic. Although conceding that what he describes is an extreme 
example, Dreyfus uses this example to illustrate his general claim that skilled action and self-
reflection are incompatible. For less extreme examples, we might consider situations in our 
own lives in which our “[f]ull concentration on a performance hamper[ed] its success” 
(Jaspers 1997, p.352) or at least made us stop and hesitate for a moment before carrying on 
with the performance as before. Also, otherwise natural bodily functions can be disturbed by 
self-reflection (ibid., pp.133-34). Many for example will have experienced not being able to 
fall asleep while thinking about how urgently they needed to sleep in order to be able to fully 
concentrate in an exam the next day. But do these examples show that action and reflection 
are in general incompatible and that thought is the “enemy of expertise” (Dreyfus 2007, 
p.354)? Dreyfus as well as others who take a similar view on the effects of objectification and 
explication implied in self-reflection do indeed acknowledge that self-reflection is important 
during processes of learning new skills (Dreyfus 2007, p.104; Fuchs 2010, p.241). They go on 
to claim however that self-reflection has to be overcome in order to gain expertise, the mode 
of action characteristic of our everyday life (Dreyfus 2007, p.104). Referring to William 
James, they think that “[i]t is a general principle in psychology, that consciousness deserts all 
processes where it can no longer be of use” (1950, p.496). Consciousness is understood as 
reflective or thematic consciousness by James. Thus self-reflection, despite its legitimate role 
in learning, remains incompatible with expert action of which it is distortive due to the radical 
opposition of immersed action and detached rationality, implicit and explicit. 
 
It could be thought that despite the action-distorting character of self-reflection on this 
picture, there remains a way to salvage self-reflection in the broad sense as a means to gain 
self-knowledge: If instead of reflecting on one’s ongoing actions one reflected on one’s 
actions in the past, it seems one could gain self-knowledge while avoiding the negative 
consequences of self-reflection, as one’s action which is the object of self-reflection would be 
completed and could therefore not be distorted anymore.  
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     However, this apparent solution disregards the character of autobiographical memory in 
which internal and external perspective are “intimately, ineluctably bound up with each other” 
(Goldie forthcoming, p.30).  One does indeed take an external, detached or observer 
perspective on oneself when one remembers a past action, it is “a familiar but remarkable fact 
about the psychology of memory [...] that the visual phenomenology of a memory of 
performing an activity like swimming across a lake will often be presented from a point of 
view above or behind the figure doing the swimming (that is, oneself)” (Moran 1994, p.91). 
At the same time however one remembers the activity from the inside, from the immersed 
perspective one had of “the events as they took place” (Goldie forthcoming, p.52). The two 
perspectives together constitute the complete memory that one has to reflect upon in order to 
gain self-knowledge. Yet on the picture of reflection drawn by Dreyfus where reflection is 
constrained to making explicit i.e. to adopt an external, detached perspective, self-reflection 
cannot take the immersed perspective of autobiographical memory into account.  
     The move to reflect upon one’s memorised instead of one’s ongoing actions can therefore 
not salvage self-reflection as a valuable means to gain insight into oneself if, as Dreyfus does, 
action and thinking are seen to be mutually exclusive. 
 
Both challenges thus arise from the apparent mutual exclusiveness of experiential dimensions 
or perspectives, a subjective, immersed perspective on the one hand and an objective, 
detached perspective on the other hand. Viewing self-reflection as adopting the objective, 
detached perspective whilst emphasising the centrality of the subjective, immersed 
perspective for what it means to be a subject and for our skilled actions, the apparent mutual 
exclusiveness of the two perspectives leads to considering self-reflection not apt to provide 
adequate insight into oneself qua subject. It equally appears not able to provide insight into 
one’s skilled actions. If one wants to maintain that self-reflection is a valuable means to gain 
self-knowledge, both challenges have to be refuted. To this purpose, the mutual exclusiveness 
of the involved perspectives has to be called into question. This will also shed a new light on 
the notions of objectification and explication. 
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Meeting the challenges 
 
The structure of Natorp’s challenge is well represented in Zahavi’s formalisation: 
 
(1) Experience is a relation between subject (qua experience) and an object (qua 
experienced). 
(2)  If the subject is to experience itself, it has to take itself as an object. 
(3)  If the subject experiences an object, it does not experience itself. 
(4)  It is impossible to experience true subjectivity. 
(2005, p.74) 
 
The formalisation again brings to light the radical opposition that is seen to obtain between 
subject and object and the fact that reflection necessarily involves an element of 
objectification. There is an illuminating imprecision in the formalisation however which takes 
us into medias res. Where Natorp speaks of ‘scientifically grasping’ subjectivity, Zahavi 
speaks of ‘experiencing’ it. Yet the two terms are by no means synonymous. Establishing pre-
reflective self-consciousness precisely showed how subjectivity is experienced implicitly 
without reflection because human consciousness is in itself reflexive. Natorp’s argument, 
whether he accepts pre-reflective self-consciousness or not does not matter in this respect, 
only challenges the possibility to reflectively experience subjectivity whence ‘experience’ 
should be replaced by ‘reflective experience’ in Zahavi’s formalisation in order to represent 
Natorp’s argument correctly.  
 
(1) Reflective experience is a relation between subject (qua experience) and an object 
(qua experienced). 
(2)  If the subject is to reflectively experience itself, it has to take itself as an object. 
(3)  If the subject experiences an object, it does not experience itself. 
(4)  It is impossible to reflectively experience true subjectivity. 
(2005, p.74, my modification) 
 
Accepting that reflection is always reflection of something and in this sense objectifying 
(premises (1) and (2)), the premise that has to be refuted is premise (3). This can be done by 
appeal to the pervasiveness of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Interestingly, Natorp’s 
argument can itself be read as a proof of the experience of pre-reflective self-consciousness, 
since without experience of it, he could not claim that it gets distorted in self-reflection 
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(Zahavi 2003, p.160). Now with pre-reflective self-consciousness in place and having shown 
that pre-reflective self-consciousness i.e. subjectivity is implied in all conscious experience, it 
follows that subjectivity is equally implied in the consciously experienced act of self-
reflection. That means that whilst involving objectification, self-reflection is permeated by 
subjectivity and that the objectification is in this sense not pure or not complete. Rather, the 
objectification being itself a subjectively experienced act, it contains subjectivity which can 
therefore not be lost nor distorted by being the object of reflection. Self-reflection is 
consequently an adequate means to enquire and gain insight into subjectivity.  
     The reflexive nature of human consciousness which gives rise to a differentiated pre-
reflective self-consciousness grounds reflection. This means that reflection is not 
incompatibly opposed to some kind of original character of subjectivity but consistent with it. 
The notion of objectification then appears in a new light: Rather than meaning that something 
is actually experienced as an object, it describes the fact of considering the objective 
dimension of an experience, of taking a certain perspective on it. Objectification of the subject 
is therefore compatible with the important insight that “[b]eing oneself is never the same as 
being an object.” (Jaspers 1997, p.350) In the same way, explication retains the implicitness 
of an experience; it shows the objective dimension of an experience without thereby 
relinquishing the implicit dimension i.e. it differentiates dimensions without favouring any 
particular one.  
     The fact that subjectivity and implicitness are retained in objectification and explication 
does not mean however that the reflective process leaves the original experience unchanged. 
Self-reflection must have effects in order to be cognitively valuable. These effects are not 
shifts of attention which would merely be different modes of the primary experience (Husserl 
1976, pp.75-76), but a new experience. The nature of this new experience is going to be 
explored in part II.  
 
Before tackling the second challenge, a brief excursus into Sartre’s thoughts about self-
reflection. Sartre writes that 
      
The motivation of reflection (reflexion) consists in a double attempt, simultaneously 
an objectivation and an interiorization. To be to itself as an object-in-itself in the 
absolute unity of interiorization- that is what the being-of-reflection has to be. [...] -
this effort inevitably results in failure; and it is precisely this failure which is 
reflection. (2003, pp.176-177) 
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Sartre, although calling it reflection, clearly speaks of self-reflection here as being to itself in 
a certain way is what is at issue. The attempt to simultaneously objectify and interiorise is the 
attempt to examine, i.e. to look objectifyingly at, subjectivity. Sartre now holds that this 
attempt is doomed to failure as in his view objectification and interiorisation are mutually 
exclusive, i.e. subject and object, as Natorp held as well, radically distinct.  
Despite this failure, reflection is possible, but in two distinct forms which Sartre calls pure 
and impure: 
 
Pure-reflection, the simple presence of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself 
reflected-on, is at one the original form of reflection and its ideal form; it is that on 
whose foundation impure reflection appears, it is that [...] which must be won by a 
sort of catharsis. Impure or accessory reflection [...] includes pure reflection but 
surpasses it and makes further claims. (ibid., pp. 177-178) 
 
The distinction between pure and impure reflection can be drawn along the lines of 
objectification, the former being non-objectifying, the latter being objectifying. But if impure 
reflection “includes pure reflection as its original structure” (ibid., p.182), how can it then 
become purely objectifying i.e. impure? I think that Sartre, like Natorp, draws the distinction 
between subject and object, in-itself and for-itself in Sartrean terms, too starkly. They both 
think that reflection aims at making the subject into an object and see, rightly, that this is 
impossible. Hence Sartre’s description of reflection as a failure. If however, as shown above, 
subjectivity is retained in the process of objectification, and Sartre’s conception of impure 
reflection including pure reflection can be read as expressing this same thought, then impure 
reflection is not purely objectifying. The distinction of pure and impure reflection therefore 
becomes superfluous and self-reflection, whilst importantly failing to make the subject into an 
object, becomes a valuable means to gain insight into one’s subjectivity. 
 
Let us now turn to the second challenge, the objection that self-reflection as a form of rational 
thinking hampers skilled or expert action. This position, put forward by Dreyfus, has been 
criticised by McDowell and inspired a debate between them about the relationship of 
rationality on the one hand and perceptual experience and action on the other hand (Schear 
forthcoming). Looking into this debate is helpful to refute the second challenge.  
     Self-reflection is a cognitive act and as such an expression of rationality. Now Dreyfus, as 
shown above, holds that rationality and action are mutually exclusive, that “mindedness is the 
enemy of embodied coping.” (2007b, p. 354). McDowell on the other hand claims that 
“perceptual experience is permeated with rationality” and “that something parallel should be 
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said about our agency” (2007b, p.339) i.e. about our intentional actions. If so, the 
rationalisation of action which happens through self-reflection cannot be said to distort the 
character of action because it is the character of action itself to be rational.  
 
To establish intentional action to be rational, McDowell has to refute Dreyfus’ conception of 
rationality. On the latter conception, rationality is seen as necessarily detached and concepts, 
which rationality develops and applies, consequently as context-independent (Dreyfus 2005, 
pp.60-61). Actions however take place in and are motivated by a concrete context which is 
perceived as immediately meaningful. This action-motivating meaning is called affordance 
(ibid., pp55-56). If now concepts are general i.e. context-independent they cannot take the 
affordance-character of a situation into account and are therefore inadequate to motivate or 
guide action. Self-reflection being rational and as such applying concepts, it consequently 
hampers action if it takes action as its object.  
     McDowell however has a different picture of rationality in mind: 
 
Dreyfus pictures rationality as detached from particular situations- as able to relate 
to particular situations only by subsuming them under content determinately 
expressible in abstraction from any situation. [...] But I think we should reject the 
picture of rationality as situation-independent. (2007b, p.339) 
 
He argues that our perceptual experience is itself conceptually structured. By this, he does not 
mean that the content of every perception is conceptual in the sense of being expressible by 
means of a specific word, but that “any aspect of its content is present in a form in which it is 
suitable to constitute the content of a conceptual capacity.” (ibid., p.346) This form of 
perception is specifically human (ibid.) and it holds for all human perception.  
 
Affordances are no longer merely input to a human animal’s natural motivational 
tendencies: now they are data for her rationality [...]. (ibid., p.344) 
 
Rationality then is not detached anymore: Actions being motivated by affordances and the 
latter being perceived conceptually i.e. rationally, concepts are realised in action. That means 
that action is permeated with rationality and self-reflection as an expression of rationality can 
therefore not be the enemy of action.6 The permeation with rationality also means that “we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Dreyfus objects that even such context-bound concepts are not at play in all action. Namely, he claims that they 
are absent from what he specifies as absorbed action for “when one is totally absorbed in one’s activity, one 
ceases to be a subject.” (2007a, p.373). Concepts requiring a subject for their application, they cannot be 
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can always ask and answer the why question” (Dreyfus 2007, p.102 about McDowell), that is, 
it permits self-reflection to yield self-knowledge. 
     On McDowell’s picture however, rationality is not the same as reflection by which he 
understands a stepping back from one’s experience. Yet “[w]hen one is unreflectively 
immersed, one is exactly not exercising the ability to step back. But even so the capacities 
operative in one’s perceiving or acting are conceptual, and their operations are conceptual.” 
(2007a, p.366) This means that perceiving and acting rationally does not require self-
reflection, it is merely the specifically human form of perception that makes it rational (ibid., 
p.348) without there being any extra mental effort needed. Self-reflection however, 
McDowell holds, is detached rationality, and he accounts for Chuck Knoblauch’s loss of skill 
by the fact that he is self-reflecting while maintaining that it is not rationality per se which is 
hostile to skilled action (2007a, p.367). I agree that self-reflection can become detached and 
thereby hamper skilled action. Those aspects are going to be examined part III. But it is and 
does not necessarily so. Following McDowell in taking rationality to be a pre-reflective, 
pervasive feature of human perception and action, this grounds the rationalisation taking place 
in self-reflection. Rationalisation is then not opposed to some kind of original character of 
perception and action, but inextricably related with it. Self-reflection and skilled action are 
therefore not mutually exclusive. 
     Now not everything one reflects upon are one’s perceptions or one’s perception-motivated 
actions. Beliefs, attitudes or desires for example do not fall into either category. McDowell’s 
conception of perception as permeated with rationality therefore does not relate to self-
reflection in the broad sense as such, but only to reflection of one’s perceptions and actions. 
In so far, it helps to refute the prominent claim that self-reflection and skilled action are 
mutually exclusive.  
 
The answers to both challenges demonstrate how what had initially been seen as mutually 
exclusive opposites are in fact related. Mc Dowell’s argument against Dreyfus’ challenge 
showed this for action and rationality and in this respect parallels the refutation of the first 
challenge where subject and object, initially seen as such opposites, were shown to be 
inextricably linked. Self-reflection then does not appear hostile to its objects, subjectivity and 
action, anymore, as, to use Dilthey’s words: “Thinking [...] is itself a form of life.” (1905, 
p.326). Thus, self-reflection can be salvaged as a means to gain self-knowledge. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
involved in absorbed action. The subject-less experience however is a myth as we have seen earlier that all 
conscious experience contains pre-reflective self-consciousnss i.e. that subjectivity is pervasive.  
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Part II: Self-Reflection as Dialectic 
The dialectical structure of self-reflection 
 
Analysing and answering the challenges levelled against self-reflection, the previous part 
showed a specific structure that underlies self-reflection: Self-reflection always has to do with 
a polarity, the poles being different aspects of an experience which are, as the challenges 
showed, easily thought of as mutually exclusive, contradictory opposites.  
     In the case of the first challenge, these apparent opposites were the subject and the object. 
The analysis then showed that, despite being distinct, subject and object are related. 
Subjectivity being pervasive, it is implied in any object-experience. Also, it is only through 
object-experience that subjectivity is experienced: Consciousness being intentionally 
structured, it is always consciousness of something, of an object, and it is in experiencing this 
object-consciousness as one’s own that one pre-reflectively experiences subjectivity. 
Experiential subject and experiential object are thus mutually dependent, i.e. subjectivity and 
objectivity at least at the level of thinking about the dimensions of our experience, implied in 
each other. As Evan says: 
 
[j]ust as our thoughts about ourselves require the intelligibility of this link with the 
world thought of ‘objectively’, so our ‘objective’ thought about the world also 
requires the intelligibility of this link. (1982, p.212) 
 
     In the case of the second challenge, self-reflection deals with the apparent opposition of 
action and rationality, immersion and conceptuality. Yet McDowell shows that concepts are 
not situation-independent and thereby retain the immersed character of action. At the same 
time, concepts are realised in action which is thereby permeated with rationality. Again, what 
were initially thought of as mutually exclusive opposites are in fact implied in each other.  
     In both cases, self-reflection has to do with a pair of clearly distinct poles, thought of as 
opposites, which in their distinctness, are inextricably linked. This means that both poles are 
equally important (Jaspers 1997, p.357). Such structure of self-reflection is not restricted to 
the above mentioned polarities of subject and object and of action and rationality, “[i]n 
psychology the polarity of opposites is all-pervasive.” (ibid., p.341)7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In this context, I take psychology to refer only to the attempt to understand oneself through self-reflection. I do 
not mean to make any claims about a general structure of human experience and certainly not to embrace 
Jaspers’ claim that all Being is polarised (ibid., p.340). However, Plessner’s conception of a dialectical 
anthropology (Heinze 2009) is interesting to consider regarding the question which role polarity plays in human 
life. His “eccentric positionality”, which he holds to be characteristic of the situation of man, describes the 
distance human beings naturally have to themselves and the resulting polarity of subjective and objective body 
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     On the conception of self-reflection that underlies Natorp’s and Dreyfus’ challenges, self-
reflection deals with the opposites in a way that does not give consideration to their equal 
importance. According to their conception, self-reflection relinquishes the subjective, implicit 
or action pole in favour of an objective, explicit or rationality pole.  But if self-reflection, as 
Dilthey said, “is itself a form of life” and life manifests itself in such polarities, why should 
self-reflection disregard the nature of these polarities? In what follows, I will present an 
alternative conception of self-reflection. This conception gives consideration to the equal 
importance of the involved poles and therefore does not fall prey to the challenges. 
 
The polarity, seen to represent a contradiction, triggers a movement which Jaspers describes 
as follows: 
 
As [the mind] makes its way from one pole to the other, it cannot tolerate 
contradiction and endeavours to overcome all contradictions, unify the polarities and 
contain them within tensions of ever-widening range. The mind grows conscious of 
the fact that all these opposites belong together and it becomes aware of the manner 
of their connectedness […]. (ibid.)  
 
 
This movement of the mind is self-reflection. But instead of overcoming one pole and 
reaching the other in form of a linear transition, it unifies the poles. This means that the 
poles are shown in their connectedness, a connectedness in separation, maintaining their 
distinctness. According to Jaspers, such a movement “is termed a dialectic.“ (ibid.) and 
self-reflection being this movement can therefore be said to have a dialectical structure.  
 
Dialectic, from the Greek διαλεκτικη τεχνη, means the art of discussion or debate leading 
to “an understanding of things that keeps moving.” (Heinze 2009, p.119) Being a debate, 
it involves different opinions which show different aspects of the object of debate. These 
aspects might be opposed or contradictory, but most importantly they are simply distinct. 
Finding a shared understanding, this understanding is never final because the distinctness 
of the aspects is maintained. Hegel, famous for his dialectical method (Forster 1993, 
p.130), has a slightly different conception of dialectic: He sees dialectic as a method of 
exposition which first shows our categories to be self-contradictory always comprising 
their opposites and then develops them into a new category that preserves the opposites 
but overcomes their contradiction (Forster 1993, p.132). The contradictory opposites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2003, p.291). A similar thought can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body which is described as 
“ambiguous” (1945, pt.1) and has recently been taken up by Fuchs (2010; 2005). 
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form the polarity identified earlier as the structure underlying self-reflection. Following 
the Greek model, this polarity does not have to be seen as a contradiction however, but 
can rather be understood to express the diversity of aspects of human life (Heinze 2009, 
p.121). Despite this re-interpretation, Hegel’s characterisation of dialectic remains useful 
in distinguishing two moments of a dialectical movement; these moments can be called 
negative and positive. The negative moment shows the polarity i.e. it differentiates 
aspects of an experience which was formerly experienced as a homogenous unity. The 
differentiated aspects become the apparently opposed poles. This can also be called 
explication. Terming it the ‘negative’ moment is in line with the understanding of self-
reflection expressed in the myth of Narcissus and by Dreyfus’ challenge: On these 
conceptions, it is the differentiation that represents a danger, i.e. which is negative, 
because the polarity it creates is understood as a contradiction forcing us to relinquish 
one of the differentiata. On my conception however, the negative moment merely makes 
the differentiata appear in their distinctness without favouring one over the over. The 
positive moment then synthesises these differentiated aspects i.e. it re-establishes the 
unity by showing how they inextricably belong together. The distinctness of the aspects 
is thereby preserved; the synthesis provides awareness of distinctness in unity or of 
differentiated unity. Negative and positive moment of the dialectic, differentiation and 
unification, are therefore of equal importance (Capone Braga 1957, p.1552). The 
synthesis is not final but the beginning of a new cycle of differentiation and synthesis 
(ibid.). In divergence from Hegel who holds that the dialectic ultimately culminates and 
ends in the absolute (ibid.), I hold with Jaspers that “[I]t is fundamentally characteristic 
of our temporal human situation that we cannot accomplish such a [final] synthesis.” 
(1997, p.343) i.e. that every synthesis remains tentative and that self-reflection is 
therefore a never-ending dialectical process. The understanding or knowledge it yields 
thus “keeps moving”, an aspect that is going to be explored in the next section. 
     Looking back at Natorp’s and Dreyfus’ challenges, one sees that they conceive of 
self-reflection as confined to the negative moment and that they understand the 
differentiation shown by it as a contradiction. It has already been said that this 
interpretation is mistaken and that the differentiation should be understood as an 
expression of the diverse aspects of human life rather than as a contradiction. Moreover, I 
hold against Natorp’s and Dreyfus’ view that self-reflection comprises both moments, the 
negative and the positive. The positive moment reunifies the differentiated aspects. Thus, 
the differentiation brought about by the negative moment does not become hostile to the 
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implicitness and subjectivity of lived life which is always a unity. Together, both 
moments of the dialectic give rise to a new awareness of an experience which is an 
awareness of differentiated unity. 
     In the case of self-reflection in the narrow sense where the negative moment 
differentiates a subjective and an objective aspect of an experience, the positive moment 
reveals how subject and object are related. Thereby, self-reflection becomes a valuable 
means to investigate one’s subjectivity. In the case of reflecting about one’s actions, the 
negative moment differentiates immersed and conceptual aspects of experiencing an 
action, while the positive moment shows how the one is implied in the other and thereby 
makes self-reflection and action compatible.  
 
 
Despite avoiding the problems associated with traditional accounts of self-reflection and 
thus paying justice to the important role that is attributed to self-reflection for healthy 
human psychic life, is a dialectical method convincing? Criticisms fall into two 
categories: The one criticises dialectic for insisting too much on contradiction and 
opposition, whereas the other criticises it for insisting too much on unity (Siebers 2009, 
p.130).  
     Regarding the first criticism, it has already been said that the polarity emphasised by a 
dialectical method is better understood to express the diversity of aspects of human life 
than to represent a logical contradiction (Heinze 2009, p.121) I will therefore focus on 
the second criticism which objects that a dialectical method promises the achievement of 
something final and relies on an absolute ending point. This idea is indeed prominent in 
Hegel’s work and Jaspers equally emphasises the idea of a whole (Jaspers 1997, pt.6). 
His claim that self-reflection has a hierarchical structure culminating in self-revelation 
(ibid., pp.349-350) can be seen to express this idea as it relies on this whole as an ending 
point. Regarding Jaspers however, this conception can be criticised by appeal to his own 
insistence that a final synthesis is never accomplished by humans (1997, p.343) and that 
self-understanding or self-knowledge is therefore importantly inconclusive (ibid., p.357). 
Final unity never being reached, its importance for the dialectical method can be 
questioned and Hegel’s starkly teleological conception of dialectic can be contrasted with 
a conception that, in Plessner’s words, sees dialectic as an “affirmation of total 
playfulness as mental health.” (Siebers 2009, p.131) i.e. that conceives of human psychic 
life as essentially open and dynamic. The question remains however what this dynamic is 
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initiated by and why the polar structure causes a ceaseless movement. This can only be 
accounted for if one assumes that “[h]umans have a need for unity.” (Heinze 2009, 
p.121) and therefore strive to unify polarities and what is differentiated. Accepting unity 
as a basic human need is not the same though as stipulating the existence of a final 
ending point. Given that one accepts this need, it is possible to conceive of self-reflection 
as a dialectical process in the non-Hegelian manner outlined above. Self-reflection can 
then be regained as a valuable activity to find insight into oneself.  
 
The effects of dialectical self-reflection 
	  
With the dialectical account of self-reflection in place, it can then be described as a process 
that differentiates distinct dimensions of a primary experience and that by revealing the 
relatedness of these dimensions gives rise to a new experience. The nature of this new 
experience is going to be explored in this section. Holding self-reflection to be a process in 
which one deliberately engages, the nature of this new experience also has to account for the 
motivation to do so. 
 
As a dialectical process, self-reflection comprises a negative and a positive moment. In the 
case of self-reflection in the narrow sense, the negative moment breaks up the unified 
experience of subject and object (which in this case is the subject tentatively seen as 
something other than itself) and shows them in their distinctness. The positive moment draws 
them back together, revealing their relatedness while retaining their distinct features. What is 
won is awareness of their relatedness in separation, i.e. of a differentiated unity. Pre-
reflectively, this unity was experienced as undifferentiated. Fuchs, drawing on Michael 
Polanyi, characterises the tacit, implicit as emerging through “processes of gestalt formation 
that enable us to understand wholes and meaningful complexes instead of individual 
elements” (Fuchs 2010, p.240). My claim now is that self-reflection equally is a process of 
gestalt formation, the emerging gestalt being a reflective sense of self. If the implicit emerges 
through a process of gestalt formation, then self-reflection can be called a higher-order 
process of gestalt formation. The emerging gestalt, the reflective sense of self, is explicit 
however, explication being the bringing to awareness of the differentiation of the unity. Self-
reflection in the narrow and the broad sense both contribute to the reflective sense of self, 
which can be seen as the sum total of the syntheses of all self-reflective processes. Jaspers, 
describing the effects of self-reflection, calls what I have termed the reflective sense of self 
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“awareness of personality” and characterises it as “always composed of two inseparable 
constituents: a feeling of self-valuation and the plain awareness of one’s particular being.” 
(1997, p.353) It is thus an awareness of oneself as a differentiated whole.  
     The reflective sense of self is not basic in the sense of being co-given in all conscious 
experience as pre-reflective self-consciousness is. It is also not basic in so far as it is an 
awareness of one’s differentiation and complexity. As self-reflective activity is a constitutive 
feature of human psychic life however, the reflective sense of self is as well.  
 
Self-reflection being a constitutive feature of human psychic life, it is inescapable; at times, 
everybody self-reflects. It does not follow from this however that self-reflection is 
uncontrollable passively going on at all times. On the contrary, it is possible to deliberately 
engage in self-reflection. Self-reflection is in this respect similar to a natural process like 
sleep: To a certain degree, we can control when we sleep and how much we sleep, but 
sometimes everybody does sleep. Once again, it is important at this point to distinguish self-
reflection from reflexivity, the latter being a solely passive process happening in the 
background at all times and constituting the very structure of consciousness. Self-reflection, 
although inevitably happening sometimes, is an active process in which one can deliberately 
engage.  
     What are the reasons to do so i.e. what benefits are expected from self-reflection? For an 
example of someone engaging in self-reflection, consider Antonio’s opening lines in The 
Merchant of Venice: 
 
In sooth I know not why I am so sad. 
It wearies me: you say it wearies you; 
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, 
What stuff ‘tis made of, whereof it is born, 
I am to learn;  
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me, 
That I have much ado to know myself. 
(Shakespeare 2005, I.1, 1-7) 
 
 
Antonio feels sad and does not know why. He does not know why he became sad, nor what 
his sadness consists in. Saying that he has “much ado” to know himself means that he will 
engage in an active process in order to find out. This active process is self-reflection and the 
benefit he expects is self-knowledge.  
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What however is understood by self-knowledge? Lowe for example uses the term to refer to 
the “particular de re knowledge of the identity of one’s own conscious thoughts and 
experiences” (1996, p.182). This particular knowledge, he thinks, is co-given in conscious 
experience: 
 
Our own thoughts and experiences, when present and conscious, are not presented to 
us as objects of our awareness, but as constituents of it, and for that reason 
inalienably ours. (ibid., p.191) 
 
 
Self-knowledge on this view is then what phenomenologists have termed pre-reflective self-
consciousness, the feeling of phenomenal mineness. But this is not what Antonio is looking 
for when he says that he wants to know himself for he is clearly aware of it being his sadness. 
The gap which he perceives between himself and his sadness is not a gap in terms of a lack of 
sense of ownership but in terms of not being able to meaningfully relate this feeling to his life. 
According to Lowe’s use of the term self-knowledge, Antonio knows himself already.  
          Another use of the term self-knowledge is suggested by Carruther’s paper “How we 
know our own minds” (2009) where knowing oneself amounts to attribute the correct mental 
states to oneself. But in this sense as well, Antonio knows himself already, for he knows that 
he is sad. Yet he is not content with this kind of self-knowledge because he still does not 
know why. Can self-reflection answer this question? And if so, is the answer correctly termed 
self-knowledge?  
 
Earlier it was mentioned that according to McDowell, action’s being permeated with 
rationality permits to ask and answer the why-question i.e. to find out about one’s motivations 
to perform a certain action. That means that the structure of our action makes action in 
principal accessible to self-reflection, a rational process, and allows self-reflection to yield 
cognitively valuable results.  If self-reflection can yield such results however does not only 
depend on the structure of our action or generally the structure of its object, but also on the 
structure of self-reflection itself. This structure was identified to be dialectical. Now Jaspers 
holds that “[d]ialectic is the form in which a basic aspect of meaningful connections becomes 
accessible to us” (1997, p.345). Meaningful connections place a singular psychological 
phenomenon into the context of one’s life (ibid., p.303), they connect it to other psychological 
phenomena and reveal its source (ibid., p.301). Thereby the merely given can become 
accepted, a singular event history and a life someone’s biography. Generally speaking, an 
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individual psychological phenomenon can thus be experienced as significant (ibid., p.349). A 
dialectical process is able to bring meaningful connections to the fore as it differentiates the 
various aspects of psychological phenomena and then synthesises these distinct singular 
aspects into a differentiated unity i.e. shows the relatedness of these aspects. The assumption, 
of course, is that meaning lies in the context, in the web of interconnected psychological 
phenomena and their diverse aspects, not in individual psychological phenomena by 
themselves.  
     Such meaningful connections are what Antonio is looking for when he asks the why-
question: He wants to find out the source of his sadness, explore the feeling in its various 
facets and connect it to other feelings like his and his friend’s feeling weary. Self-reflection, 
conceived of as a dialectical process, will be able to provide him with answers to these 
queries. 
 
Importantly however “[t]he realm of meaning is unbounded” (ibid., p.315) i.e. there is no one 
final and definite meaning, but always room for further and different meaningful connections 
between the various aspects of psychological phenomena. In contrast to Hegel’s conception of 
dialectic on which it culminates and ends in a final synthesis, my conception of dialectic 
regarding self-reflection is therefore open-ended and the understanding it yields always 
remains inconclusive (ibid., 357). Such conception can be called hermeneutical. Jaspers 
describes this dialectical and hermeneutical process of understanding in the following way: 
 
We achieve understanding within a circular movement from particular facts to the 
whole that includes them and back again from the whole thus reached to the 
particular significant facts. The circle continually expands itself and tests and 
changes itself meaningfully in all its parts. A final ‘terra firma’ is never reached. 
(ibid.) 
 
The particular facts are the individual psychological phenomena and their various, potentially 
opposed aspects which are differentiated by the negative moment of the dialectic. The whole 
is the synthesis reached in the positive moment of the dialectic, showing the relatedness of the 
individual aspects and containing them. This synthesis is inconclusive however, it can be and 
is indeed differentiated again itself, thus leading to a new round of negative and positive 
moment.  
     The synthesis being inconclusive is why Sartre thinks of self-reflection, which he takes to 
be the attempt to achieve unity, as a failure. Yet it is precisely this failure which motivates the 
dialectical movement to go on as it maintains the difference the experience of which is 
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required for understanding (Gadamer 1960, p.273). The latter lies in the synthesis, but the 
need for synthesis only arises through the experience of difference. The synthesis is then 
carried out in an “anticipation of completeness” (ibid., p.299) i.e. of overcoming the 
difference, this anticipated completeness acting as a regulative ideal without ever being 
reached and difference being forever maintained. Despite not achieving a final goal, this 
process is productive giving rise to understanding and creating new meaning (ibid., p.301). 
Inconclusiveness being an essential characteristic of meaning and meaningful human life, the 
negative undertone of the Sartrean term failure is misguiding.  
 
It is debatable whether the understanding yielded by self-reflection is correctly termed self-
knowledge. Jaspers for example holds that “self-reflection is something essentially different 
from knowledge” (1997, p.349) and that “[i]f we desire final knowledge in the field of self-
understanding, we have made a completely wrong start (ibid., p.350). The conception of 
knowledge underlying this clear distinction between knowledge and understanding sees 
knowledge to require “an object which will continue to exist and be available” (ibid., p.349), 
to be “quiet stability” (ibid.) instead of ongoing movement, to be “certain” and “final” (ibid., 
p.350). Such conception of knowledge is widespread in Western thought (Wild 1979, p.17) 
and the understanding yielded by self-reflection certainly and importantly does not fulfil these 
criteria: its object changes as the hermeneutical round moves on and a final certainty is never 
achieved. Furthermore, whereas knowledge is seen to be general, meaningful connections 
only hold between aspects of particular psychological phenomena and understanding is 
therefore concrete (Jaspers 1997, p.314).  
     If this is ground enough to give up the notion of self-knowledge regarding the effects of 
self-reflection and to adopt the notion of self-understanding instead, or if the notion of self-
knowledge can be kept while being aware of its special characteristics seems to be a merely 
terminological issue. What is important is that self-reflection provides us with significance the 
latter being essentially inconclusive and that self-reflection is therefore a never-ending 
process. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the effects of self-reflection which, due to the limited scope of 
this essay, cannot be explored in detail, is the relation of self-reflection and normativity. 
According to Korsgaard, raising “the normative question is to ask whether our more 
unreflective beliefs and motives can withstand the test of reflection.” (1996, p.47) and 
normativity therefore “is a problem for human beings because of our reflective nature.” (ibid., 
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p.49)  This link between self-reflection and normativity becomes especially clear when self-
reflection is described as a process of self-alteration. I have formerly characterised the effects 
of the negative moment of self-reflection as the bringing to awareness of differentiation. 
Zahavi describes the same phenomenon saying that “reflection is [...] a kind of self-awareness 
that is essentially characterised by an internal division, difference, and alterity.” (2005, p.91) 
Developing the idea of alterity further, Sartre holds impure reflection to try to look at one’s 
own experience as if it was someone else’s (2003, e.g. p.360). On his view, this gaze of the 
other is always objectifying and therefore hostile to subjectivity. Yet it was shown that this is 
because Sartre, like many others, wrongly conceives of subject and object, self and other, as 
strictly mutually exclusive. If they are not, self-reflection being an alteration of a primary 
experience means that it differentiates the formerly unified experience and shows it in its 
various aspects one of which is the aspect of being seen from the perspective of someone else. 
Only because the unified experience of an action, belief or desire is differentiated can the 
normative question be asked. Also, the apparent opposition of the subjective and the objective 
has a special relevance regarding normativity. The term normativity can be seen to include a 
notion of objectivity in so far as a norm has to be considered not only to have authority for 
oneself but also for others. But a norm can only influence one’s action if it is considered as a 
part of one’s subjectively lived life (Nagel 1979, p.205). By its synthesising activity, self-
reflection could possibly offer a way in which to reconcile these potentially conflicting, but 
most importantly simply different, dimensions whose coexistence is “an irreducible fact of 
life.” (ibid., p.213) 
Part III: Psychopathology and Self-Reflection 
Too much or too little? Pathologies both ways  
	  
Describing self-reflection as a dialectical process including a negative, differentiating 
alongside with a positive, synthesising moment  allowed for explication without relinquishing 
the implicit, and thus refuted claims that self-reflection is inherently dangerous, be it as “the 
enemy of expertise” (Dreyfus 2007, p.354) or as a fatal endeavour leading to self-loss as in 
the case of Narcissus.  Nevertheless, as Dreyfus’ and Jaspers’ examples show, there remains a 
risk implied in self-reflection (Jaspers 1997, p.342) which needs to be accounted for. This risk 
and the relation of self-reflection and psychopathology are going to be explored in the 
following section. Once more in this respect, it is important to bear in mind the distinction 
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between the passive process of reflexivity which is an inherent feature of consciousness on 
the one hand and the active, cognitive process of reflection on the other hand. 
 
Disturbances of self-reflection are appealed to regarding a variety of psychiatric disorders. 
Fuchs (2010) for example accounts for insomnia, compulsive disorders, hypochondria, body 
dysmorphic disorder and schizophrenia in terms of an excess of self-reflection. Dimaggio et 
al. (2009) consider disorders of self-reflection to be involved in schizophrenia, alexithymia, 
posttraumatic stress disorder and a generally poor capacity to integrate inconsistent feelings 
and behaviours. To explore whether, as they tentatively try to establish (ibid., p.659ff), there 
is one disturbance underlying all of these conditions is beyond the scope of this essay. A point 
to consider for further research in this respect is a disparity of aspects which seems to be 
present in all the above mentioned disorders8. On all accounts, the link between self-reflection 
and psychopathology is seen in quantitative terms i.e. the psychopathological phenomenon is 
accounted for by either an excess or a lack of self-reflection. Jaspers in this vein repeatedly 
stresses the importance of the balance between reflection and non-reflection (1997, p.131). On 
his view, symptoms of mental illness arise when this balance is disturbed. In the case of too 
little self-reflection, a lack of intentional control follows and one feels overpowered by and 
helplessly delivered to what is simply happening (ibid.). In the case of too much self-
reflection on the other hand, one’s intention can have unintended effects on what is 
happening: it can get in the way of the natural flow of action as described by Dreyfus and it 
can disturb bodily, instinctual functions like urination, sleep and sexual intercourse (ibid.). 
Compulsion, being characterised by the discrepancy of what one believes to be justified and 
what one feels compelled to (ibid., p.134), is equally linked with self-reflection as it is only 
through self-reflection, more precisely through the negative moment of self-reflection, that 
one can become aware of the separateness of these two aspects of one’s motivation.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In compulsive disorders and insomnia, what one rationally intends stands opposed to what one actually does or 
to what happens (Jaspers 1997, p.133). In hypochondria and body dysmorphic disorder the actually healthy state 
of the body cannot account for the perceived fear of illness or feeling of abnormality (Fuchs 2010, pp.244-245). 
In alexithymia, one observes a decoupling of experiential and physiological arousal, the former being low, the 
latter high (e.g. Stone & Nielson 2001). Posttraumatic stress disorders are characterised by the incapacity to 
sufficiently distinguish between the fantasy of intruding, threatening memories and reality in which the sufferer 
is safe (Megías et al. 2007). In schizophrenia finally, several such disparities can be observed, e.g. the patient’s 
lack of insight into their illness (Kraepelin 2010; van der Meer et al. 2010, p.943) but also, experientially for the 
patient, the lack of agency i.e. the disparity between observed action of her body and perceived feeling of control 
and initiation of this action (Franck et al. 2001).	  
9	   Jaspers’ characterisation of compulsion is similar to the Greek concept of akrasia which describes the 
phenomenon of acting against one’s own rational belief (Aristotle 2002, bk.VII, chap. 3). In Sartre’s work, the 
same phenomenon figures under the name of “bad faith” (Sartre 2003, pp.70-94).   
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     In the following section, the conception of psychopathologies as quantitative disturbances 
of self-reflection is going to be challenged. Facing the multitude of psychopathologies which 
are seen to be related to disturbances of self-reflection, the analysis will focus on the role that 
self-reflection plays in schizophrenia. It will be shown that by adopting a dialectical account 
of self-reflection, a structural rather than a quantitative disturbance of the latter can account 
for the symptoms experienced in schizophrenia. 
  
Schizophrenia and Self-Reflection 
	  
Schizophrenia is one of the classic psychiatric diagnoses that is, according to Kurt 
Schneider’s first-rank symptoms, characterised by audible thoughts, hearing of voices 
arguing, discussing or commenting, somatic passivity experiences, thought withdrawal and 
other experiences of influenced thought, thought broadcasting, delusional perceptions and all 
other experiences involving made volition, made affect and made impulses (Berner et al. 
1992, p.21). The diagnostic criteria currently used in clinical practice are laid down in the 
ICD-10 (World Health Organization 1992, sec. F20) and the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000, sec.295-298.9). From a cognitivist point of view, lack of insight into the 
disease, termed anosognosia, and deficits in social cognition are typical (van der Meer et al. 
2010, p.943). Recently, researchers from various fields have started exploring the link 
between self-reflection and schizophrenia hoping to identify a common feature underlying the 
various symptoms. In this respect, neuroimaging studies support the view that self-reflective 
processes are altered in patients suffering from schizophrenia (ibid.) 10.  
     
Beck et al. (2004) conceive of this alteration as a deficit. Taking their starting point from 
Kraepelin’s (2010) view that anosognosia is centrally involved in schizophrenia, they devised 
a questionnaire to assess patients’ insight into their illness by exploring items on two scales, 
self-reflectiveness and self-certainty. By self-reflectiveness they understand the ability to take 
an objective view on one’s cognitive distortions, the ability to put these into perspective, and 
the openness to corrective feedback (ibid., pp. 320-322). They found these abilities to be 
significantly decreased in patients suffering from schizophrenia, whereas the patients’ self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  In their review of 20 neuroimaging studies exploring the neurological basis of self-reflection, van der Meer et 
al. (2010) found concurrent evidence for the involvement of so-called Cortical Midline Structures CMS 
(especially the medical prefrontal cortex MPFC, posterior cingulate cortex PCC and anterior cingulate cortex 
ACC) in self-reflective processes. In schizophrenia, an altered function of the ventral MPFC was found by most 
studies. Holt et al. (2011) specified this alteration as an anterior-posterior shift of activation in the CMS. 
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certainty i.e. their conviction to be right, was increased (ibid., p.325). The observed 
anosognosia is thus attributed to a lack of self-reflection. A study exploring the relation 
between cognitive impairment and anosognosia could not attribute anosognosia to a general 
cognitive impairment and saw an alteration in the activation-patterns of the CMS (Ries et al. 
2007) thus suggesting that self-reflection and general cognitive capacities are distinct and that 
it is indeed a deficit of the former that accounts for the lack of insight. According to Beck’s 
account, schizophrenia is thus a disorder that centrally involves too little self-reflection. 
 
In apparent opposition to these findings stands research that holds schizophrenia to be 
characterised by overmentalisation (Abu-Akel 1999) or hyperreflexivity (Sass & Parnas 2003; 
Fuchs 2010). Differing from the Kraepelian emphasis of empirically observable phenomena, 
these studies are conducted in the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology and “focus 
on the study of subjectivity in schizophrenia” (Sass et al. 2011, p.1) i.e. on the phenomenal 
experience of the patient. Importantly however, both traditions are not to be seen in stark 
contrast to each other; especially in recent years, more and more empirical studies have 
provided support for “the reality of clinical-phenomenal disorders of self-experience” in 
schizophrenia (ibid., p.2) (for on overview see Parnas & Sass 2010).  
     It is important to note that these authors speak of reflexivity, not of self-reflection. There 
seems to be confusion however: Fuchs uses the terms interchangeably (2010, p.239) and Sass 
et al’s distinction (2011, p.12) remains unclear. I will argue in the next section that what they 
mean falls in fact under what this essay has so far established as self-reflection. For the 
ongoing presentation of their account however, I will stick to their term “hyperreflexivity”. 
     Hyperreflexivity is one element of Sass and Parnas’ “Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity-Model” 
(Sass et al. 2011) with which they hope to account for the apparent heterogeneity of 
schizophrenic symptoms. Ipseity being “the sense of [...] self that is normally implicit in each 
act of awareness” (ibid., p.7), in other words, pre-reflective self-consciousness or the sense of 
phenomenal mineness which is also referred to as minimal self (ibid.), they hold this basic 
sense of self to be disturbed in schizophrenia. This results in diminished self-affection i.e. “a 
diminished sense of being a vital, first-person perspective on the world” (ibid.) on the one 
hand and hyperreflexivity i.e. “exaggerated self-consciousness involving self-alienation” 
(Sass & Parnas 2003, p.429) on the other hand. Both disturbances revolve around the implicit-
explicit dimension and are complementary to each other:  
 
Whereas the notion of hyperreflexivity emphasizes the way in which something 
normally tacit becomes focal and explicit, the notion of diminished self-affection 
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emphasizes a complementary aspect of this very same process- the fact that what 
once was tacit is no longer being inhabited as a medium of taken-for-granted 
selfhood. (ibid., p.430) 
 
     The balance between implicit, or tacit, and explicit, thus is the claim, is disturbed in 
schizophrenia, it is shifted towards the explicit. Hyperreflexivity, seen as the making explicit 
of what is and should be implicit, goes hand in hand with the diminished self-affection i.e. a 
loss of implicitness. If the latter, the deficit in pre-reflective self-consciousness, is at the root 
of the symptoms as the description of schizophrenia as a self-disorder (ibid., p.427) suggests, 
then hyperreflexivity can be seen as a “compensatory hyperfunctioning of aspects of the self-
reflection system” (Dimaggio et al. 2009, p.660). Hyperreflexivity on this model however 
entails loss of implicitness and the two aspects of the disorder thus reinforce each other. Fuchs 
(2010) adopts a similar understanding of hyperreflexivity. 
     How does this model apply to the symptoms encountered in schizophrenia? One of the 
most characteristic symptoms is voice-hearing as for example described by Jaspers’ patient 
Kieser (Jaspers 1997, p.73): 
 
Sometimes I could hear one and the same word repeated without interruption for 
two to three hours. I had to listen to long continuous speeches about me; frequently 
the content was insulting and there was often an imitation of well-known persons. 
[...] Sometimes one could only just hear these incessant, uninterrupted sounds but 
sometimes one could hear them a half or full mile away. [...] All the time my ears 
keep ringing and sometimes so loudly that it can be heard far and wide. When I am 
among woods or bushes and the weather is stormy, some horrible, demoniacal 
poltergeist is aroused; when it is quiet, each tree starts rustling and uttering words 
and phrases when I approach. 
 
     The distinction between inside and outside, self and other, appears blurred. Is it his ears 
that are ringing or is it the trees that are talking to him? Alongside many others, Sass and 
Parnas interpret what the patient hears as external voices as in fact inner speech which the 
patient fails to recognise as her own (2003, p.432). They account for the failure of recognition 
by the deficit of implicitness of the inner speech i.e. by its lack in feeling of mineness, 
combined with it having become explicit through hyper-reflexive activity. Inner speech is the 
usually implicit mode of thinking (ibid., p.433). 
 
It appears then that the auditory-verbal hallucinations most characteristic of 
schizophrenia (“first rank symptoms”) involve a sense of alienation from and a 
bringing-to-explicit-awareness of the processes of consciousness itself. (ibid.) 
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     Another symptom observed in schizophrenic patients is the feeling of being caught up in 
thought. Blankenburg’s patient Anne expresses this saying that “It is impossible for [her] to 
stop [her]self from thinking” (Blankenburg 1971, p.46). In the same context, de Haan and 
Fuchs cite a patient reporting: 
 
I constantly have to ask myself “who am I really?” It is hard to explain … most of 
the time, I have this very strange thing: I watch myself closely, like, how am I doing 
now and where are the “parts” – […]. And that occupies me so much, to think about 
my condition, because it is not just one condition, it is always more conditions, that 
is exactly what is not functioning. I think about that so much that I get to nothing 
else. (2010, p.329) 
 
     This excessive act of thinking, interpreted as hyperreflexivity, is seen to be an inadequate 
try to compensate for the diminished pre-reflective self-consciousness; inadequate because the 
implicit self-assuredness cannot be re-established through making it explicit (Fuchs 2010, 
pp.248-249). On the contrary, excessive engagement in self-reflection and self-observation 
leads to even further estrangement. Consequently, a vicious circle develops. This can result in 
the complete loss of natural action: 
 
If I do something like going for a drink of water, I’ve to go over each detail- find 
cup, walk over, turn tap, fill cup, turn tap off, drink it. (Chapman 1966, p.239) 
 
     Here, the most mundane action becomes a complex task as through hyperreflexivity, 
consciousness is flooded “with sensory data to a degree beyond the limits of normal 
experience”. (ibid., p. 225) i.e. with explicit sensory data that usually form the implicit, tacit 
background of an action.   
     To summarise, it can be said that the above-mentioned authors see the relation between 
schizophrenia and self-reflection in too much of a self-reflection the result of which is too 
much explicitness. Explicitness on their part implies a loss of implicitness. It is suggested that 
an initial deficit in implicitness in the form of diminished pre-reflective self-consciousness i.e. 
a diminished feeling of experiential mineness, underlies the exaggerated self-reflective 
process.  
 
     The phenomenological characterisation of schizophrenia as a hyper-reflexive disorder thus 
stands in direct opposition to the view supported for example by Beck et al (2004) that 
schizophrenia is characterised by a lack of self-reflection. “Too much or too little?” thus 
seems to be the question when considering both accounts. Yet it will be shown that this is the 
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wrong question to ask as by adopting a dialectical account of self-reflection, schizophrenic 
symptoms can be accounted for by a structural disturbance of schizophrenia rather than 
attributing them to a quantitative abnormality. Regarding the apparent contradiction of the 
Beckian and the Sassian account, it has to be noted that the two characterisations concern 
different manifestations of schizophrenia: whereas the Beckian account aims to explain 
anosognosia as it is observed by the clinician, the phenomenological account tries to shed 
light on phenomena like voice-hearing and being caught up in thought as the patient 
experiences them. Given the different perspectives, first-person and third-person, the opposite 
interpretation of the role of self-reflection perhaps does not have to take wonder. It would be 
desirable however to be able to give an account of the relation of self-reflection and 
schizophrenia that can accommodate the phenomena seen from both perspectives. It will 
emerge from the following critical analysis that a dialectical account of self-reflection is 
capable to provide precisely this besides, as mentioned above, allowing a quantitative 
description of the disturbance of self-reflection. 
 
First of all, it must be stressed that Sass et al. provide a very well observed phenomenological 
description of schizophrenic symptoms and that their Ipseity-Hyperrelexivity-Model (2011) is 
compelling for it identifies a single disturbance which underlies the various symptoms of 
schizophrenia and which can also account for a fundamentally altered (self-) experience. My 
critique does therefore not concern the description of the symptoms, but the conception of 
self-reflection underlying the Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity-Model. As Fuchs seems to embrace 
this model in his recent paper on hyperreflexitivity (2010), my critique applies to his position 
as well.  
     Fuchs uses the terms ‘reflexivity’ and ‘reflection’ interchangeably (ibid.). It could be 
objected however that Sass et al. (2011) do not speak of self-reflection at all but of 
hyperreflexivity and that it is therefore mistaken to relate their account of schizophrenia to the 
work on self-reflection of this essay. Yet it was mentioned earlier that Sass et al.’s distinction 
of the terms ‘reflexivity’ and ‘reflection’ remains unclear. Unfortunately, they only define the 
pathological forms, ‘hyperreflexivity’ and ‘hyperreflection’, the former as leading to an 
“automatic popping-up or popping-out of phenomena and processes that would normally 
remain in the tacit background of awareness [...], but that now come to be experienced in an 
objectified and alienated manner.” (ibid., p.7). Hyperreflexivity also involves intellectual and 
volitional processes (ibid., p.12). Assuming that the non-pathological form, reflexivity, has 
the same structure and only less pronounced effects, their conception of reflexivity seems to 
31	  
	  
be close to what Dreyfus calls self-reflection and, in so far as one refrains from the negative 
evaluation of explication, to our everyday understanding of the term. Sass et al are keen 
however to distinguish reflexivity from reflection, holding the latter to be an “intellectual or 
volitional process of a “higher” nature” (ibid.). Yet what they mean by ‘higher nature’ 
remains unclear seeing that on their picture, reflexivity brings tacit background phenomena to 
a new awareness which in my understanding is thereby of a ‘higher nature’ already. I 
therefore suggest that the term ‘reflexivity’ be saved for the turned-back structure of 
consciousness which gives rise to the feeling of phenomenal mineness, i.e. to pre-reflective 
self-consciousness. Reflexivity then is a non-volitional, non-intellectual process in keeping 
with non-thematic consciousness11. In contrast, reflection is an intellectual process, partly 
volitional, bringing about a thematic awareness of the experiences reflected upon and thereby 
being, in Sass et al’s words, of a ‘higher nature’. In the following, I will understand Sass et 
al.’s hyperreflexivity as hyperreflection and use the latter term.  
     Is it then convincing to characterise schizophrenia as a disorder of hyperreflection? The 
above definition of hyperreflexivity shows a stark opposition of “tacit” on the one hand and 
“objectified” on the other hand. Self-reflection is situated on the objectified-side of the 
opposition. Fuchs expresses this view of self-reflection as follows: 
 
Reflexive consciousness, the turning back of attention to the process of life itself, 
can also exercise an analytical, decomposing effect, as it were, on the implicit 
couplings of embodiment. Then we can literally not see the forest for the trees- a 
phenomenon that I would described as the explication of the implicit. [...] A further 
insight is to be gained here: reflexive consciousness is not capable of, so to speak, 
going back to the sources of embodied enactions [...]. (2010, pp.241-242) 
 
The “explication of the implicit” being seen to imply the loss of the implicit, this view of self-
reflection brings back the image of self-reflection as inherently dangerous for lived life. An 
excess of it is then necessarily even more dangerous. This conception of self-reflection 
however could be refuted by showing that implicit and explicit are not mutually exclusive and 
led to developing a dialectical account of self-reflection on which self-reflection is itself a 
form of life and does therefore not represent a danger to it.         
     Yet I agree that in schizophrenia something goes fundamentally wrong with self-reflection, 
and that the balance between implicit and explicit is shifted towards the explicit which 
thereby becomes disconnected and dominant. Patients clearly experience being caught up in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Interestingly, on this conception, hyperreflexivity would lead to an excess of pre-reflective self-consciousness 
whereas Sass et al. want to hold that the latter, to which they refer as self-affection, is diminished in 
schizophrenia. 
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self-reflective thought as shown in the above examples. How can this be accounted for by a 
dialectical account of self-reflection? On this account, the negative moment of the dialectic 
differentiates what was formerly experienced as a unity, it brings about a separation of aspects 
of this experience and in so far destroys the unity which is characteristic of implicitness. But 
in healthy self-reflection, the positive moment ensues and synthesises these aspects, showing 
their relatedness in the new light of having experienced their separation i.e. re-establishing the 
unity on a higher level. My claim now is that it is this synthesising moment of self-reflection 
that is deficient in schizophrenia and that schizophrenia is thus a disturbance of the structure 
of self-reflection rather than a quantitative divergence from the norm for self-reflective 
activity. The insight that synthesis is impaired in schizophrenia can already be found in 
Jaspers who points out the “failure to unify” resulting in the “drastic realisation of one 
tendency without its counter-tendency” (1997, p.343). Regarding passivity phenomena like 
voice-hearing and thought insertion, it can then be said that they result from the failure to 
unify the objective aspects of one’s experience with its subjective aspects. Similarly, the 
experience of being caught up in thought ensues from the inability to establish the tie between 
thinking and action, to experience thinking itself as action and as such as action-guiding. 
Finally, the lack of insight which is observed from the perspective of another person can be 
accounted for in terms of a deficit in relating self-observances i.e. cognitive insight to the 
experience of oneself. This tallies with Beck et al.’s claim that schizophrenia is characterised 
by denial of the illness, their claim being in fact more specific than it at first seems: Namely, 
they speak of there being a discrepancy between emotional and intellectual insight (2004, 
p.320), between accepting an explanation and being convinced by it (ibid.). This exactly 
expresses the inability to incorporate facts one knows about oneself from self-observance into 
one’s self-experience i.e. once again the failure to unify objective and subjective aspects of an 
experience. Thus a dialectical account is able to accommodate the phenomena described by 
Beck et al. from a third-person perspective as well as the phenomena which Sass et al. find in 
first-person reports. The result of this disturbance of self-reflection is a disturbed reflective 
sense of self as the latter, established in part II, emerges from the sum total of the syntheses of 
all self-reflective processes.  
 
To conclude, schizophrenia should be understood as a disturbance of self-reflection, not, as 
Sass et al. hold, of reflexivity. If one then conceives of self-reflection as a dialectical process, 
it is possible to give a qualitative account of the disturbance which appears to lie in a deficit 
of the synthesising moment. Such an account gives us a richer understanding of the nature of 
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the disturbance than a merely quantitative account can provide. The characterisation of 
schizophrenia as a self-disturbance can be maintained if one holds that in healthy individuals 
a reflective sense of self naturally accompanies the pre-reflective one. However, this 
reflective sense of self is not what Sass et al. call the “fully constituted self” (2011, p.11) or 
the “self-as-object” (ibid.) and they are right in saying that the self-disturbance seen in 
schizophrenia affects something more basic 12. Conceiving of self-reflection as a dialectical 
movement differentiating equally important aspects of a unified experience and showing them 
in their relatedness explains why self-reflection and the reflective sense of self are of such 
central importance for human psychic life and why a disturbance has such fundamental 
consequences. The analysis of the relation of self-reflection and schizophrenia thus affirms 
the centrality of self-reflection in human psychic life and supports its dialectical structure.  
	  
Conclusions 
 
This essay originated from the confusing situation in which we find ourselves when we 
consider the Delphian calling to self-knowledge, presumably to be pursued by means of self-
reflection, and then hear Tiresias’s warning to Narcissus that he should only live long if he 
never comes to know himself. Seeing the tragic consequences that ensue when Narcissus 
reflects himself, should we ignore the Delphian calling and give up self-reflection? Analysing 
the risk of self-reflection as illustrated in the myth of Narcissus by considering Natorp’s and 
Dreyfus’ challenges, a polar structure underlying self-reflection could be identified and it 
could be shown that the risk arises due to a conception of self-reflection that sees the involved 
poles, for example subject and object, action and rationality, as mutually exclusive opposites. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  By saying that the reflective sense of self is something more basic, I do not suggest that it should be equated 
with the minimal sense of self i.e. ipseity. Both are clearly distinct. If, as Sass et al. (2011) hold, the latter is 
disturbed in schizophrenia can be questioned I think. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine this aspect 
in detail. Due to the centrality of the ipseity-disorder on Sass et al.’s model, it should be mentioned however that 
Zahavi for example points out in an earlier paper that “[...] since the afflicted subject is aware that it is he himself 
rather than somebody else who is experiencing these foreign thoughts, that is, since the subject does not confuse 
thoughts occurring in foreign minds with foreign thoughts occurring in his own mind, it is questionable whether 
these “foreign” thoughts really lack the quality of “mineness”, whether they really lack the first-person mode of 
givenness.” (2001, p.340) It seems that ipseity is preserved in these severe disturbances, that the minimal self 
remains intact. It is impossible to hold that the sense of first-person givenness of experience is lost in 
schizophrenia unless one wanted to say that schizophrenic patients lack phenomenal consciousness altogether, as 
this sense of mineness, this basic form of self-consciousness, is constitutive of intentional consciousness. It is 
also the pre-condition for self-reflection as shown in part I i.e. hyperreflection cannot take place without there 
being ipseity. Sass et al. (2011) clearly embrace this relation between pre-reflective self-consciousness, 
intentional consciousness (ibid., p.9) and self-reflection. Now they do not claim that ipseity is entirely lost, but 
only that it is disturbed. Given that ipseity is a simple phenomenon however, a minimal self, I am unclear about 
what a disturbance can possibly consist in. 
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Refuting their mutual exclusiveness, the poles could be interpreted as different aspects of an 
experience and self-reflection consequently conceived of as a dialectical process, 
differentiating these aspects in a negative moment and showing them in their inextricable 
relatedness i.e. synthesising them, in the entailing positive moment. Self-reflection could thus 
be regained as a valuable means to gain insight into oneself, bringing about an awareness of 
oneself as differentiated unity. The awareness of this unity provides meaning and can be 
termed self-knowledge bearing in mind the essential inconclusiveness of the achieved unity.  
     Applying the dialectical account to the psychopathology of schizophrenia, it could be 
shown that the latter does not have to be conceived of in terms of a quantitative disturbance of 
self-reflection, too much or too little, but should be understood as a qualitative disturbance, 
namely a disturbance of the positive, synthesising moment. Thus, the findings of a cognitivist 
approach and the findings of a phenomenological approach could be reconciled. The 
possibility of such a disturbance can account for Narcissus’ fate whilst self-reflection as such 
can be maintained as a means to gain self-knowledge. Refuting the view that self-reflection is 
adverse to lived life and therefore at most a tool in learning processes which then has to be 
overcome, emphasises the healing potential of self-reflection and vindicates its status as an 
important method in psychotherapy.  
     It is hoped that the dialectical account provides a convincing framework for our everyday 
understanding of self-reflection which sees self-reflection as a valuable activity for gaining 
self-knowledge whilst being aware of the potential risk it bears thereby giving consideration 
to both, the Delphian calling and Narcissus’ fate.  Having drawn on Jaspers’ work on self-
reflection in developing this account, it is also hoped that this essay may inspire further and 
more scholarly research on this aspect of Jaspers’ work. 
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